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ing buyer will trade." Id. Without this evi-
dence of value, the jury's verdict would 
not be based on articulable objective 
facts. Even though the owner testified she 
originally had paid $750.00 for the prop-
erty and the accused (certainly not a will-
ing buyer) paid $100.00 to repurchase 
the television set, neither purchases were 
indicative of fair market value. 
The Court stated that the only depar-
ture from the strict rule of proof would be 
where the "stolen property (1) had been 
recently purchased at a price well in ex-
cess of $100.00; (2) was in 'mint condi-
tion' at the time of the theft; and (3) was 
not subject to 'prompt depreCiation or ob-
solescence.' " 376 A.2d at 444. 
The government's proof was thus suffi-
cient to sustain a conviction only for petit 
larceny, a misdemeanor. With this charge, 
all that is necessary is for the government 
to show that the stolen items had value. 
The Court closed with an oblique 
reference to what may be poor trial prepa-
ration on the part of the U.S. Attorney's 
Office. It noted, at 376 A.2d 444 n. 3, 
that there has been "a continuing indica-
tion of failure in governmental proof suffi-
cient to establish a felony rather than a 





by John Jeffrey Ross 
On July 13, 1974, a young woman was 
allegedly raped in the District of Colum-
bia. This event provoked a search by her 
relatives and friends for some neighbor-
hood justice. Mrs. Mary Harris, grand-
mother of the assault victim, accompanied 
this crowd of vigilantes to a Washington 
home wherein the rapist was thought to 
reside. As two men from the group forced 
their way through the front door they shot 
down an innocent third party, Louis 
Sisler, who tried to prevent their entry. 
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Sisler died at an emergency room 
shortly thereafter, but not before he pro-
vided, by way of admissible "spontaneous 
utterances," testimony leading to the 
murder and burglary convictions of the 
assailants. See Harris v. United States, 
373 A.2d 590 (D.C. App. 1977). 
The tragiC events of that day have led 
to further prosecutions, and the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals has recently 
adjudicated the appeal of Mrs. Harris from 
her convictions for conspiracy to commit 
assault with a dangerous weapon, at-
tempted first degree burglary while 
armed, and felony murder. Mrs. Harris 
had been brought to justice for her role in 
aiding and abetting the forcible entry of 
the murder victim's home and his shoot-
ing. Harris v. United States, 377 A.2d 34 
(D.C. App. 1977). 
On appeal, Mrs. Harris claimed that the 
trial court erroneously resolved the 
follOWing issues against her: 
'SuffiCiency of the evidence to sustain 
accomplice guilt for attempted first 
degree burglary; 
2statements by the decedent admitted 
against her; 
3sufficiency of the evidence to show ac-
complice guilt for the first degree 
felony murder; 
4refusal by the trial court to impanel, 
sua sponte, a second jury to hear Mrs. 
Harris' untimely insanity defense or to 
conduct a voir dire of the jurors to 
determine prejudice against such a 
defense; 
5prejudical statements by the prosecu-
tor concerning Mrs. Harris' insanity 
defense, even though the trial court 
provided instructions to mitigate their 
impact. 
She further complained that the 
offenses upon which the felony murder ac-
cusation was based should have been 
merged with the homiCide, thus removing 
support for the first degree murder con-
viction. 
The court affirmed the convictions, in-
dicating by a recital of the group's pur-
poseful actions that the evidence, when 
viewed in a light most favorable to the 
government, clearly showed criminal 
animus for revenge and armed, forcible 
entry into the victim's home-thus suffi-
cient evidence for attempted first degree 
burglary while armed. [d., at 36-37. Con-
cerning accomplice guilt, the court saw as 
dispositive numerous actions by Mrs. Har-
ris indicative of her role as a motivating 
force in the group's search for revenge 
which led it to the scene. The court re-
jected her claim that her leaving the scene 
prior to the murder was sufficient to avoid 
criminal liability. 
The court reasoned that absent an affir-
mative move to "disavow or defeat" the 
criminal purpose, or "definite decisive" 
steps shOWing complete abandonment of 
the illegal undertaking, the departure was 
ruled insufficient "as a matter of law" to 
show withdrawal from the criminal en-
terprise. Id., at 38. 
As to HarriS' liability in the felony 
murder, the court stated that the killing 
was within the scope of the burglary per-
petrated by Harris and her prinCipals; a 
natural and probable consequence of, and 
not merely "coincident" to, the illegal en-
try. 377 A.2d at 37-38. 
On the failure of the trial court to im-
panel, sua sponte, a second jury to hear 
her insanity defense or to question venire-
men of the present panel to determine 
prejudice against this defense, the court 
stated that Harris had abruptly changed 
her defense tactics at trial by an untimely 
assertion of the insanity defense; there 
was no right to a second jury, and that ab-
sent a timely request by counsel for voir 
dire on the insanity issue, the trial judge 
did not abuse her discretion in the manner 
in which she conducted the trial. Also 
fatal to the appellant's claim was the ab-
sence of objection to the "manner and 
method" of the court's use of the jury. 
In addition, the court dismissed claims 
that the prosecutor made statements of 
such import as to prejudice the defense. It 
was held that proper jury instructions 
remedied their effect, and that a fair trial 
was preserved. 377 A.2d at 39-40. 
The final issue to be considered was 
Mrs. Harris' claim that the felony murder 
conviction must be reversed because the 
offenses on which the felony murder was 
based should have been merged into that 
homicide as lesser included offenses. In 
other words, she contended that 1) the 
burglary was based upon the intent to 
commit assault with a dangerous weapon; 
2) the assault, with elements common to 
the homicide, must be merged with it; and 
3) there being no underlying separate 
felony, there was no felony murder. The 
defense thus read the facts as showing an 
intent to enter the home solely to assault 
Sisler, i.e. one continuous criminal trans-
action from entry to homicide. 
The doctrine of merger, where not 
abrogated by statute, is applicable so that 
an accused will not face "double punish-
ment" for one act. At common law, the 
rule was given effect where the same act 
generated more than one offense. Klein v. 
State, 151 Md. 484, 135 A.591 (1926); 
MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw, 50 (1934); CLARK AND 
MARSHALL, CRIMES, § 2.03 (7th Ed. 1968). 
The defense theory in Harris failed for 
three basic reasons. First, the burglary 
was a distinct offense committed for the 
demonstrated purpose of finding ·an in-
dividual the attackers thought was other 
than the murder victim. See Harris v. 
United States, 373 A.2d 590, 593 n. 8. 
This intent to enter to find the "third par-
ty" gave the burglary a specificity apart 
from the homicide--an element of intent 
separate from the killing. Second, 22 D.C. 
Code § 2401 proscribes as felony murder 
a killing in any housebreaking. Third, 
"[T] he societal interest served by the 
burglary statute [22 D.C. Code § 1801], 
protection of occupied dwellings, is sepa-
rate and distinct from that of the murder 
statute, security and value of the person." 
377 A.2d at 38. 
As the Court of Appeals stated in a case 
clearly on point: 
[Defendant] committed burglary by 
knowingly entering [victim's] home 
with the intent to assault him. Having 
committed the burglary and violated 
the appurtenant societal interests, it 
was still possible for [defendant] and 
his companions to withdraw from the 
premises without attacking [the vic-
tim]. But continuation of this criminal 
conduct resulted in the death. . . and 
the commission of a second distinct 
crime. 
Biango v. United States, 373 A.2d 885, 
888 (D:C. App. 1977). 
The court in Biango found that a con-
viction for felony murder was appropriate 
for policy reasons even where the criminal 
event was isolated, in terms of both mens 
rea and actus reus, to the immediate par-
ties, i.e. no intent was shown to enter for a 
purpose other than to kill the immediate 
victim. An even stronger case against 
merger is thus found in Harris where there 
are indicia of two separate criminal pur-
poses. 
In this case, where the homicide is an-
cillary to the attempted burglary, the 
following observation is appropriate: 
It is said that if [the accused] arms him-
self with the intent to shoot anyone 
who interferes with the commission of 
the burglary, he is chargeable with such 
premeditation as to render him guilty 
of murder in the first degree. 
1 WARREN ON HOMICIDE § 74 at 332 (1938). 
Ancient 
Decisions 
by Robert C. Becker 
There it is, volume one, number one. It 
is all done in one paragraph and about 
one-quarter of the page. Still it is the first 
reported case in United States jurispru-
dence. 
In days when Maryland was more freely 
dispensed than it is today, one William 
Boreman filed a preliminary claim to four 
hundred acres at Nanjemoy. Charles 
County people take note. He had the 
ground surveyed, occupied it, and con-
sidered it his own. He failed, however, to 
perfect a patent to his land within the time 
specified in the original warrant. 
Meantime, Captain William Stone, ap-
parently realizing the defect in Boreman's 
claim, filed and perfected a patent to the 
same land. When Captain Stone under-
took to occupy land then his, dispute 
naturally arose. It came to the attention of 
the provincial court. Stone v. Boreman 1 
H & McH 1 (1658). 
The court held that Boreman had lost 
his claim by failing timely to perfect his 
patent. Stone was the rightful owner of 
the land in question. Boreman was still 
entitled to four hundred acres and might 
have it elsewhere in a "convenient place." 
[d. at 2. Basic equity is affordable where 
land is plentif~l. 
The interesting part of this rather short 
report concerns the treatment of the sur-
veyor who laid out Boreman's original 
claim. The court seems to hold that he 
should have known of the fault in Bore-
man's filing and should have either 
warned him of it or simply refrained from 
the commission. At any rate he is held 
responsible for surveying, without charge, 
such new claim as Boreman shall take and 
perfect. 
This is a decision hardly possible in to-
day's circumstances. Land is not granted 
four hundred acres at a time; rather it is 
bitterly litigated by the foot. It is neces-
sarily the product of an era when royal 
charters were framed in terms of latitudes 
north and south to the setting of the sun. 
Still, it is a decison embodying the virtues 
of brevity and fairness, criteria we yet 
strive to meet. 
An Afternoon Spent Browsing in the 
Dusty Section of a Small Law Library 
1 Harris & McHenry (1658) 
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